Background: Strengthening the surveillance of zoonotic diseases emergence in the wild meat value chains is a critical component of the prevention of future health crises. Community hunters could act as first-line observers in zoonotic pathogens surveillance systems in wildlife, by reporting early signs of the possible presence of a disease in the game animals they observe and manipulate on a regular basis. Methods: An experimental game was developed and implemented in a forested area of Gabon, in central Africa. Our objective was to improve our understanding of community hunters' decision-making when finding signs of zoonotic diseases in game animals: would they report or dissimulate these findings to a health agency? 88 hunters, divided into 9 groups of 5 to 13 participants, participated in the game, which was run over 21 rounds. In each round the players participated in a simulated hunting trip during which they had a chance of capturing a wild animal displaying clinical signs of a zoonotic disease. When signs were visible, players had to decide whether to sell/consume the animal or to report it. The last option implied a lowered revenue from the hunt but an increased probability of early detection of zoonotic diseases with benefits for the entire group of hunters. Results: The results showed that false alerts—i.e. a suspect case not caused by a zoonotic disease—led to a decrease in the number of reports in the next round (Odds Ratio [OR]: 0.46, 95% Confidence Interval [CI]: 0.36–0.8, p¿<¿0.01). Hunters who had an agricultural activity in addition to hunting reported suspect cases more often than others (OR: 2.05, 95% CI: 1.09–3.88, p¿<¿0.03). The number of suspect case reports increased with the rank of the game round (Incremental OR: 1.11, CI: 1.06–1.17, p¿<¿0.01) suggesting an increase in participants' inclination to report throughout the game. Conclusion: Using experimental games presents an added value for improving the understanding of people's decisions to